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Abstract Many people look to religion to help resolve the serious moral and legal issues associated with assisted reproductive tech-
nologies. Doing so presupposes that religion is the cornerstone of ethics, but this assumption is not well founded. While various faiths
are entitled to articulate their views on matters of human reproduction, the contradictions involved in doing so make it unwise to
rely on religion in the formulation of law and policy. These contradictions – such as the indeterminacy about what revealed truths
means – make moral secular philosophy a better guide for the protection of human welfare. RBMOnline
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Introduction
Contraception, abortion, artificial insemination, IVF, preim-
plantation genetic diagnosis, preconception sex selection or
reproductive cloning: there is literally not a single bioethical
issue that Christian and other religions have passed over in
silence (Engelhardt, 2000). In itself, there is surely nothing
wrongwith this. Churches and their clergy are clearly entitled
to take a stance on moral matters, but there is something
peculiar about the religious statements on these matters.
Religious statements claim to be based on a higher authority
than statements based on secular evidence. Remarkably, not
only proponents of various faiths, but also their opponents
grant religious leaders a kind of moral supremacy and tend
to believe that theologians are somehow experts on ethical
issues.Why is that? One answer is obvious, in thatmost people
still consider religion and ethics to be inseparable. Evenmore
than that, some people believe that religion is the very foun-
dation of ethics, thatwithout theology there can be nomoral-
ity (Holloway, 1999).
This situation is remarkable because it is not true. In fact,
it is so blatantly untrue that onemust wonder how this mixing
of religion and morality could possibly survive the age of
reason. I am not sure how to account for the privilege society
gives to religious belief, but I suppose theWestern belief that
ethics is based on religion is – in part – the result of two
millennia of religious cultural dominance and indoctrination.
For example, many children are brought up thinking that
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moral rules derive from the Ten Commandments of the Old
Testament. The idea that moral rules like ‘You shall not lie;
you shall not steal; or you shall not kill’ are of a religious
nature is so engraved in children’s minds that that they will
hardly ever question their religious nature, not even as an
adult. Even the writer Fyodor Dostoevsky seemed to have
believed that theology is the cornerstone of morality
when he wrote: ‘If God did not exist, everything would be
permissible’ (Anderson, 2007).
Churches and their clergy certainly welcome the assump-
tion that religion is the necessary and indispensable founda-
tion of ethics. They may even feed this belief by raising
their fingers and proclaiming social disaster if we don’t
acknowledge their moral authority. In exactly that spirit,
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, once
warned of an impending ‘dictatorship of relativism’ if
religion is set aside. The main thesis is that if we turn our
back on God, we will be literally unable to tell right from
wrong, but this thesis is dubious on its own terms.
The Divine Command theory
So why exactly is it wrong to claim that religion is the cor-
nerstone of ethics? The idea that morality is based upon the-
ology is best illustrated by the contradictions that attach to
the so-called ‘Divine Command Theory of Ethics’. According
to the Divine Command Theory, telling right from wrong is
easy: right is what God approves of, and wrong is what
God disapproves of. For example, since God approves of
fidelity and disapproves of infidelity, fidelity is good and infi-
delity is evil.
The Divine Command Theory is, however, deeply flawed.
As the Greek philosopher Socrates had noticed more than
2000 years ago, supporters of this theory are faced with
an inescapable dilemma. The dilemma shows itself in
answer to the simple and quite innocent question: ‘Is char-
ity good because God approved of it, or did God approve of
charity because it is good?’
If someone answers that ‘charity is good because God
approves of it’, that person would have to admit that if
God happened to approve of cruelty rather than charity,
cruelty would be good and charity would be evil. Given
that a supporter of the Divine Command Theory will prob-
ably not cede God to be an entirely arbitrary lawgiver that
way, he will probably hasten to add ‘true, but God would
never approve of cruelty because He is good’. But this
answer doesn’t get the supporter of the theory out of trou-
ble; it gets him even deeper into trouble. After all, what
can it possibly mean to say that God is ‘good’? If ‘good’
only means to be ‘approved by God’, then ‘God is good’
only means that ‘God approved of himself’, which is true
by definition and therefore not an informative claim. In
other words, the Divine Command Theory renders God’s
commands arbitrary and reduces the doctrine that God is
good to a tautology.
The only way to avoid this unacceptable conclusion is to
say ‘charity is not good because God approved of it. God
approved of charity because it is good’. Thus, it could be
argued that charity is good because it helps relieving human
suffering and reducing the amount of misery in the world
and that these are the real reasons why God approves of
charity. This is certainly a much more reasonable response
as an explanation. Moreover, on this response, the doctrine
that ‘God is good’ can actually be preserved because it does
not open God’s judgments to include outcomes that would
contradict that equation.
Those using this response, however, are also faced with a
dilemma. By saying that God approves of charity because
charity is good, they are admitting that there is a standard
of right and wrong that is entirely independent of divine
being or intention. It is not God’s approval or disapproval
that makes some actions right and others wrong. Rather,
it is their effect on human welfare that makes some actions
right and others wrong, or whatever effect that might divide
the good from evil. In other words, God would be relying on
a criterion of morality external to divine being.
The British philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell put
the matter this way in 1927: ‘The point I am concerned with
is that, if you are quite sure there is a difference between
right and wrong, then you are in this situation: Is that differ-
ence due to God’s fiat or is it not? If it is due to God’s fiat,
then for God himself there is no difference between right
and wrong, and it is no longer a significant statement to
say that God is good. If you are going to say, as theologians
do, that God is good, you must then say that right and wrong
have some meaning which is independent of God’s fiat,
because God’s fiats are good and not bad independently of
the mere fact that he made them. If you are going to say
that, you will then have to say that it is not only through
God that right and wrong came into being, but that they
are in their essence logically anterior to God’ (Russell,
2008). Hence, theologians and other religious believers
who turn to this explanation – that good exists indepen-
dently of Divine Will –have virtually abandoned a theologi-
cal conception of ethics; on this view, it is not clear that
God is necessary in order to tell right from wrong. Instead
of turning to God to decide what is good and what is evil,
we may as well turn directly to the ultimate standard of
right and wrong (Rachels, 2006).
The implications of the chain of arguments that Socrates
set in motion are evident. Contrary to what Christian and
other religious leaders claim, ethics is not based on religion
and morality is independent of theology. In this sense,
moral theologians do not have a greater claim on moral
truth than moral philosophers or any other person willing
to use the tools of reason available to them to improve
human welfare.
The Natural Law theory
For the reasons just given, the Divine Command Theory has
never really been the dominant theory of ethics in the his-
tory of Christian theology. At least in Roman Catholicism,
the dominant theory of ethics has always been – and still
is – the Theory of Natural Law. According to this theory,
we are to respect the natural order created by God and to
follow the Natural Law that the creator has placed in us.
The Natural Law, it is claimed, is written and engraved in
the soul of each and every man. It is immutable and eternal
and it tells us what we ought to do in the sense that it iden-
tifies the goods toward which we are inclined by nature and
which perfect us (Narveson, 1999).
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Probably the most notorious claims in contemporary
Natural Law are the objections to contraception and homo-
sexuality as being ‘against nature’ or ‘unnatural’. According
to the theory, everything in nature has a purpose, including
our organs. The purpose of our eyes is to see. The purpose
of our heart is to pump blood. The purpose of our genitals is
to make babies. Using our genitals in any way that defeats
their purpose to procreate and is therefore contrary to the
Natural Law and is, as such, morally impermissible. Accord-
ingly, the catechism of the Catholic Church teaches: ‘Every
action which proposes to render procreation impossible is
intrinsically evil’. Moreover, the very nature of marriage
is said to preclude assisted reproductive treatments
because they betray the natural meaning of that union
between man and woman (Congregation for the Doctrine of
the Faith, 2008).
What are we to make of the Theory of Natural Law? Short
shrift, I would say. The idea that everything in nature has a
purpose is based on an outdated teleological worldview
developed by the Greek philosopher Aristotle. Ever since
Charles Darwin’s 1859 On the Origin of Species by Means
of Natural Selection, a teleological worldview that every-
thing is ordained toward an ulterior purpose has lost its
power and its charm. From an evolutionary point of view,
the purpose of sex is separable from making babies. As asex-
ual reproduction attests, not all procreation needs to
involve sexuality and the biological advantages of sexual
reproduction are still a hotly debated issue among evolu-
tionary theorists. At this point in history, it is safe to assume
that sexuality has many different functions – genetic,
reproductive and recreational (Dennett, 2006).
Moreover, the whole idea that everything in nature has a
purpose and that it is morally wrong to use it for anything
other than its natural purpose is hopelessly obscure. What
is the natural purpose of our fingers? To grasp, to climb,
to knock? If we choose any one of these functions or a small
list of them, are we really to say that it is unnatural and,
therefore, immoral to use our fingers to play the Moonlight
Sonata?
I first offered the comments here at a meeting in a
lecture hall of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, a hall
named after the German philosopher Leibniz, which means
it is probably tempting fate to mention the name of his
antagonist, the French philosopher Voltaire. Yet I cannot
help but think of Dr Pangloss in Voltaire’s immortal Can-
dide who taught ‘that things cannot be otherwise than as
they are; for as all things have been created for some end,
they must necessarily be created for the best end.
Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles,
therefore we wear spectacles. The legs are visibly
designed for stockings, accordingly we wear stockings’.
This satirical treatment of Natural Law teleology is not,
of course, the same as a proper philosophical refutation,
but it points in the direction of key problems in the theory
as an account of ethics. Apart from the problems just men-
tioned, there is another difficulty for the Theory of Natural
Law. According to the Roman Catholic church – and I
quote – ‘the precepts of Natural Law are not perceived
by everyone clearly and immediately. In the present situa-
tion, sinful man needs grace and revelation for moral
truths to be known’. In other words, Natural Law cannot
be complete by itself, by definition. But if this is true,
then we are back to square one: how to account for the
moral value of revealed truth.
The problem of divine revelation
The problem of identifying divine revelation (is it really
divine?) and the problem of identifying the moral signifi-
cance of that revelation (what does it actually mean?) are
problems that face Jewish, Christian and Muslim believers
alike. In their own way, all believers accept the idea that
God has spoken through sacred texts, such as the Talmud,
the Bible or the Koran. In these Holy Scriptures, the
Almighty has issued commands that we ought to obey. The
Divine Will, as revealed in these sacred texts, tells us what
is morally right and what is morally wrong. For millions of
religious people, this claim appears to be straightforward.
For instance, at Sunday school, Christian children are taught
to sing: ‘Jesus loves me! This I know for the Bible tells me
so’. It may have been songs like this one that prompted
the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins to condemn reli-
gious education as a form of mental ‘child abuse’, for mat-
ters of biblical meaning are much more complicated than
that. The very existence of a multiplicity of sacred books
– the Talmud, the Bible and the Koran, to name just the
most widely known – requires making some kind of choice
among them. Each of them claims that they contain the
one and only revealed truth. However, given that these
scriptures contradict each other, they cannot all be true
(though they can all be wrong). In what possible way could
human beings decide which of them contains revealed truth
as such? As far as I can see, a venture like this must fail
because of the insurmountable epistemological problem.
Even if there was a viable solution to this problem of
identifying revealed truth as such, we would be faced at
once with a new difficulty. Suppose, for example, that
Christians were right in believing that their Bible is indeed
the true word of God. How could this possibly help us solving
the issues we are currently faced with? As we all know, the
Old Testament as well as the New Testament are altogether
silent on preimplantation genetic diagnosis, preconception
sex selection or embryonic stem cell research. Judgments
about these contemporary issues must necessarily involve
human judgment and moral interpretation made indepen-
dently of revealed truth.
Someone could continue to defend a theological
approach by saying ‘no, the Bible doesn’t say anything about
enhancement, cloning or xenotransplantation, but the Bible
is still quite explicit on numerous other issues that could be
used as a way to evaluate contemporary issues, including
assisted reproductive treatments’. But this very concession
opens the door to another epistemological difficulty. It is
indeed true that the Bible has quite a lot to say about proper
human conduct. For example, it counsels people to ‘love
your neighbour as yourself’ and to ‘treat others as you wish
to be treated’. However, the Bible also says ‘you may not lie
with a man as with a woman; it is an abomination’. Doing so
is quite literally a deadly sin. Does this mean that we are
morally obliged to kill homosexual men and women? Some
strict interpreters of this text might accept that interpreta-
tion, but most contemporary Christians would not. In fact,
most contemporary Christians would reject that obligation
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explicitly! But why? Because these believers maintain that
God is good and that God cannot be good if he really wanted
homosexual men and women stoned to death. But this inter-
pretive methodology raises an important question: how can
believers accept the Bible as the revealed word of God and
at the same time refuse to do what God tells them to do? In
a sense, they can only do this by introducing moral stan-
dards that do not derive entirely and exclusively from
revealed truths.
Some religious believers claim that the Bible is literally
the word of God, but not all believers accept that view.
Some accept the idea that certain human perspectives are
expressed in sacred texts because they were written by
human beings at times very different from our own. In other
words, some of the moral precepts do reflect the will of the
Almighty, but other moral precepts simply reflect the prej-
udices of the human authors of the sacred texts. Again, this
claim raises an insuperable epistemological problem: how is
it possible to decide which divine revelations are genuine
and to be taken at face value and which are not? What direc-
tives for human beings belong to divine intention and which
express only the moral sentiments of the day? If we decide
to sort through these issues as most religious believers actu-
ally do, by using moral criteria, we are virtually conceding
the impossibility of the task. After all, what is the point
of browsing through sacred texts when we end up declaring
only those moral rules to be approved by God that we hap-
pen to approve of for reasons unrelated to Divine Will or
readings of Nature?
Instead of relying on sacred texts, some religious believ-
ers could resolve this problem by relying on divine revela-
tions made to them personally. Doing so would solve the
problem of relying on others’ interpretations, but as a solu-
tion to the epistemological problem it doesn’t get us very
far. For example, some say that God has told them to give
away their riches; others may say God has told them to
sacrifice their only son. No matter the content of the reve-
lation, how could we know a revelation as divine, as against
it being an artefact of our psychological lives? Furthermore,
if we say that the personal revelation to give everything to
the poor is genuine, but the one to kill the only son is not,
we are, once again, relying on moral criterion that are
external to the revelation itself. It may well be a waste of
time to cede moral authority to personal revelations if we
then go on to judge those revelations on the basis of our
own non-revealed moral standards anyway (Dawkins, 2006).
And what is the general meaning of personal revelations:
how do they apply, if at all, to others?
To conclude this excursion into the logical difficulties of
turning to revealed religion for moral guidance, let me
briefly go back to the Pope’s claim that a secular society
falls victim to a ‘dictatorship of relativism’. This statement
presumes something that is not true: it presumes that there
is one faith and one religious ethics. But as we all know,
there is no one religious faith. There are literally hundreds
of religious faiths, even within Christianity alone there are
hundreds of variations and they disagree about theological
matters as well as moral matters. For example, not even
all Catholics agree about homosexuality, abortion or
assisted reproductive treatments. In this sense, not even
revealed religious truth has proved a bulwalk against moral
relativism within the ranks of the faithful.
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